From a news snippet from the Nuclear Threat Initiative regarding a new Council on Foreign Relations report about new nuclear deterrence.

Timely given what I believe to be the new "Golden Age of Proliferation."  However, it seems a little too "safe."  Its not bold.  Check out the bolded sections for the highlights:


"The United States must develop a nuclear deterrence strategy that moves away from Cold War ways of thinking, the Council on Foreign Relations said in a report issued yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 5).

While the nuclear-armed powers in decades past sought to deter an atomic exchange through the threat of a devastating response, that is almost certain to fail against a terrorist group armed with a nuclear bomb, experts argue.

Nonetheless, there is a widespread argument for a system of deterrence that would emphasize threats against nations to ensure they do not provide terrorists with nuclear weapons or sensitive materials, according to the nonpartisan organization.

“The rush to transform Cold War deterrence into a weapon against nuclear terrorism opens the door to a host of unintended yet dangerous consequences,” states the report, Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism.  “Wielded wisely, a new twist on deterrence can make important contributions to strengthening nuclear security.  But applied incautiously and indiscriminately, it could deeply undermine efforts to that same end.”

Report author Michael Levi rejected arguments that threatening other governments could lead them to increase security against diversion of nuclear material into terrorists’ hands.  Such threats could instead reduce cooperation in the nuclear security sector and would generally not provide a significant amount of leverage, he said in a press release.  One exception could be in the case of LACE w:st="on">North KoreaLACE>, Levi said.

Among the report’s recommendations are:

— Focusing on cooperation with Pakistan and Russia  “Threatening retaliation against countries like Russia and Pakistan in response to terrorist attacks stemming from lax security practices is unwise,” the report says.  “It undercuts efforts to work cooperatively with those states to improve their nuclear security; dissuades those states from informing others if they discover that their nuclear weapons or materials are ever stolen, thus undermining any efforts to recover them; and makes it difficult to work with those states in the aftermath of an attack to prevent further detonations.  At the same time, U.S. threats are likely to do little to actually encourage (Russia orPakistan) to take nuclear terrorism more seriously”;

— Using caution in any deterrence plan for North Korea.  North Korea is unique among nuclear states in that there is a real prospect that, absent the possibility of retaliation, its leaders might deliberately transfer nuclear materials to a terrorist group. ... Strategists are thus correct to adapt Cold War deterrence to this case.  But this task is not as simple as having the ability to attribute nuclear materials to North Korea and threatening to retaliate following any attack”;

— Using restraint in ambiguous situations.  "The United States must sharpen its declaratory policy by stating that the U.S. president may still decide, based on compelling but imperfect evidence, to retaliate following a nuclear terrorist attack.  At the same time, if the United States does retaliate following a terrorist attack, it must be firm (almost certainly by applying substantial force against military targets), but, most likely, restrained, including by avoiding the use of nuclear weapons and by stopping short of regime change”; and

— Displaying U.S. capabilities to determine the source of nuclear material.  The United States “should aim to increase its perceived ability to attribute such attacks not only by investing more in the means to trace nuclear materials, but also by publicly demonstrating those capabilities on a regular basis by consistently and vigorously investigating nuclear leaks and publicizing the results,” the report says.  “It should also develop shared procedures and understandings with North Korea's neighbors ... for deciding whether Pyongyang is the source of nuclear materials used in any attack” (Council on Foreign Relations release, Sept. 22).

Quite clearly, the US should display its ability to "source" possible nuclear material.  However, what happens in those ambiguous cases where iron clad proof remains elusive?  Are we then to be unable to retaliate?  Clearly, this issue of proliferation is much larger than only the gangster type regime in Pyongyang.  How do we confront Tehran, not to mention any number of other nations soon to travel down the path of seeking their own nuclear capacity? 

In order to calibrate deterrence, it would seem we must be able to definitively attribute the source of any material used in a possible terrorist attack.  However, I am deeply concerned we won't be able to do this quickly enough to ensure a viable deterrent or, for that matter, accurately enough either.

Finally, one element of the report indicates we should not threaten retaliation due to "lax security" lest we run the risk of those nations not cooperating in the first place.  Obviously, that is a legitimate concern, but are we so sure there would be cooperation anyway, irrespective of our official policy with respect to retaliation?  No doubt baseless accusations and threats is folly in the extreme, but disregarding all possible options as a matter of course without at least reviewing the contingency of the moment seems quite the folly as well.