I came across two articles today that firmly encapsulate in my mind the direction our nation is moving in and I found myself deeply troubled.  I am troubled at a level that is visceral and almost makes me ill because I fear that the problems of the moment, as bad as they undeniably are, will usher in not a better world, but a worse one. 

The first article is from Newsweek.  The headline proclaims it all- "We Are All Socialists Now."  Rather than explain the full piece let me leave a quote from the piece that sums it well:

"A decade ago U.S. government spending was 34.3 percent of GDP, compared with 48.2 percent in the euro zone—a roughly 14-point gap, according to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. In 2010 U.S. spending is expected to be 39.9 percent of GDP, compared with 47.1 percent in the euro zone—a gap of less than 8 points. As entitlement spending rises over the next decade, we will become even more French...

Now comes the reckoning. The answer may indeed be more government. In the short run, since neither consumers nor business is likely to do it, the government will have to stimulate the economy. And in the long run, an aging population and global warming and higher energy costs will demand more government taxing and spending. The catch is that more government intrusion in the economy will almost surely limit growth (as it has in Europe, where a big welfare state has caused chronic high unemployment). Growth has always been America's birthright and saving grace."

The second article comes from an author that I have always been deeply fond of, the Classical military historian, Victor Davis Hanson.  As I read his concluding paragraphs and thought about them in conjunction with the Newsweek story my fears of the past came back to me.  Hanson makes explicit how the post-modern, secularized man that refuses to reproduce and looks only for the pleasures of this world has led to statism.  Below is the relevant section.

"I had a conversation (an argument) recently with a European, about contemporary culture. I tried to explain the mutually reinforcing elements of socialism, atheism, utopianism, pacifism, and statism (he was giving America a second chance to morph into Euros under Obama). But if one believes in no transcendence, that there is nothing other than the present, then for too many satisfying the appetites becomes the prime directive. Childlessness, living at home in one's 30s, dependence on the state, all that derives from a system that ensures equality of result, and substitutes Logos and Ratio for any notion of a deity that sees sin and sacrifice, and reminds us that our souls are immortal and affected by their brief residences in our flesh. In other words, that Euros expect free health care, free care for their elderly parents, free schools, free defense from the USA, harbor little hopes for rising above the station of anyone else, find housing and jobs scarce, and don't feel they can or want to leave behind something for their children larger than what they inherited-- are all interrelated phenomena. European postmodern man offers mostly platitudes that he thinks please those who might be dangerous to him, and finds psychological recompense and solace by gratuitously trashing those who aren't. Note how such constitution peoples favor Hamas over Israel--and usually almost anyone over the US. Were Hamas a successful democracy that took no European aid and offered it in turn no threats, and Israel a failed fascistic terrorist movement that depended on Europe for aid and comfort, while engaging in terrorism and voicing postmodern platitudes about oppression, then we would expect Israel to be a strong European ally. (I think many Europeans are more sympathetic to the Palestinian Authority or Syria or Iran than the incipient democracy in Iraq)."

So how is "post-modern" man different from Nietzsche's terrible vision of the "Last Man."  Compare for yourself as Nietzsche's prophet, Zarathustra speaks:

"I say unto you: one must still have chaos in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star. I say unto you: you still have chaos in yourselves.

Alas, the time is coming when man will no longer give birth to a star. Alas, the time of the most despicable man is coming, he that is no longer able to despise himself. Behold, I show you the last man.

'What is love? What is creation? What is longing? What is a star?' thus asks the last man, and blinks.

The earth has become small, and on it hops the last man, who makes everything small. His race is as ineradicable as the flea; the last man lives longest.

'We have invented happiness, 'say the last men, and they blink. They have left the regions where it was hard to live, for one needs warmth. One still loves one's neighbor and rubs against him, for one needs warmth...

One still works, for work is a form of entertainment. But one is careful lest the entertainment be too harrowing. One no longer becomes poor or rich: both require too much exertion. Who still wants to rule? Who obey? Both require too much exertion.

No shepherd and one herd! Everybody wants the same, everybody is the same: whoever feels different goes voluntarily into a madhouse.

'Formerly, all the world was mad,' say the most refined, and they blink...

One has one's little pleasure for the day and one's little pleasure for the night: but one has a regard for health.

'We have invented happiness', say the last men, and they blink."

I see little difference.

Nietzsche said that God is Dead, by which he meant that WE have killed him in our desire to be "enlightened" during our push to become masters of our own fate in this world without transcendance.  Nietzsche saw that without God, nihilism, a lack of faith in anything, was inevitable.  He tried to replace God with a Godlike man- the notorious Ubermensch or Overman.

He may have been wrong in his solutions, but he clearly diagnosed the malady of modern man.  Today more than ever we stand on the precipice of America joining Europe and becoming "post-modern" which is really nothing more than becoming "Last Men."

The greatness of spirit that was such a constant through most of human history is intentionally being homogeneized with the vague, but discernable desire to enforce equality of outcome.  "Greatness" is scoffed at, ridiculed, and referred to as "selfish", "narrow-minded", and contrary to the communitarian ideals that supposedly will save this planet from our own evil born of ignorance.

There will not be a levelling up, there will only be a levelling down.  From where will come the next Plato, Aristotle, Alexander, Cicero, Augustine, Aquinas, or Dante?  Where will even be the next Washington, Lincoln, or Churchill?

Socialism breeds sloth.  I know that there is a need for government to restrain the excesses that are inherent in flawed man.  However, we are taking steps that go far beyond the necessary restraints and limited assistance that is needed to assure people don't "fall through the cracks."  We are choosing to make the world that our children (if we choose to have them) are born into a world of bland mediocrity that denigrates what has been so noble about humanity.

Yes, its true, the price for greatness and nobility is some instability, some danger, but the desire to eradicate that can only lead to a sterility that saps man of what has made him human. 

The religious societies are vastly more human than the experiment we are attempting to consolidate.  Ironically, there is disorder in those societies, but they are human.  Perhaps, that is not as bad a thing as so often we think it is.  Perhaps, we'll look more deeply before setting sail for a destination that is preordained to destroy our very souls and leave us empty husks that will over time be easy pickings for those that still understand how to be humans.

The Romans largely failed to do that and they became history.  America is not yet doomed for a repeat performance, but our Attila and Alaric is out there waiting for an opportune moment to strike at our cracked foundations.  We should defend those foundations and not become the "Last" Post-Modern Man.

Since Obama's ascencion to the Presidency, there has been a renewed focus on many elements of foreign policy.  It is quite likely that few will equal in importance the new overtures being made towards Russia as it relates to new agreements on both nations' nuclear weapon stockpiles.

With the START Treaty expiring at the end of 2009, there is a unique opportunity to revisit the issue of how many nuclear weapons the US and Russia will maintain in their arsenals.  President Obama has made clear his desire to push for a dramatic reduction to the tune of 1,000.

President Obama clearly believes that by our limiting the number of weapons we have (which can only be done in conjunction with comparable Russian limits), the US will have the moral authority to reach out to would be nuclear weapons states and convince them that they need not continue moving down that path.

To that end, there has been some press coverage that then President-elect Obama essentially sent former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to Russia to meet with Vladimir Putin and open the door to further conversations along these lines.  This article from a british paper details this rumour, which it must be made clear, both Obama and Kissinger deny.  Rather, Kissinger admits to meeting Russian President Medvedev, but never says he met with Putin, nor does Kissinger indicate that the conversations were in any way authorized by the President.

Of course, given Kissinger's long history of secretive diplomacy while serving President Nixon (see Paris Peace Talks with the North Vietnamese and, spectacularly, the opening to China where he feigned illness and secretly boarded a plane in Pakistan to  go to China without the press' knowledge), his protestations of Presidential intent may be viewed with some skepticism.

Clearly, Kissinger appears to want to cement his legacy as a peacemaker.  As I referred to previously, Kissinger is advocating heartily for a strong US-China relationship to manage economic issues.  Now, it appears, he is pushing just as hard to cement a strong US-Russian relationship in order to stem the seemingly inevitable tide of nuclear proliferation.  This article that Kissinger wrote for Newsweek, does an excellent job of outlining his positions on prolferation.  A few excerpts are in order:

"More than 200 years ago, the philosopher Immanuel Kant defined the ultimate choice before mankind: if world history was to culminate in universal peace, would it be through moral insight, or through catastrophe of a magnitude that allowed no other outcome?  We are approaching a point where that choice may be imposed on us. The basic dilemma of the nuclear age has been with us since Hiroshima: how to bring the destructiveness of modern weapons into some moral or political relationship with the objectives that are being pursued. Any use of nuclear weapons is certain to involve a level of casualties and devastation out of proportion to foreseeable foreign-policy objectives. Efforts to develop a more nuanced application have never succeeded, from the doctrine of a geographically limited nuclear war in the 1950s and 1960s to the "mutual assured destruction" theory of general nuclear war in the 1970s."

This paragraph is fascinating as it encapsulates so much of Kissinger's thoughts over the years.  He returns to Immanuel Kant, the philosopher that developed the concept of the "categorical imperative" and the notion of cosmopolitan, perpetual peace as a way to explain the juncture he feels we are at when it comes to the future of nuclear weapons.  Of course, Kissinger spent a lot of time with Kant in his younger days, writing his senior thesis at Harvard (the longest thesis ever written at Harvard) on the topic of the "Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee, and Kant."  Though by no means a Kantian in the sense that Kant is somewhat of a determinst (as are both Spengler and Toynbee), it appears Kissinger wanted to avoid the full blown pessism inherent in at least Spengler's views of the "Decline of the West."  Kant did accomplish this at a certain, though imperfect level.

Given that consideration, for Kissinger now to return to Kant so late in his career, and quite likely his life, is telling.  This is especially so given the issue of choice which has always been at the core of his thought.  Additionally in the paragraph above, you can also see references to the debates over the use of nuclear weapons from previous eras of the Cold War.  Kissinger was quite influential in those early debates.  In fact, the "nuanced application" was very much an idea he expounded upon in one of the books that brought him to the attention of a mass audience, or at least and audience of key policy intellectuals.

That he now embraces a Kantian choice and is critical of not just the theory of "Mutually Assured Destruction" but his own previous inclinations towards flexibility in the use of nuclear weapons, shows a man in a reflective mood pondering how to shape a legacy that will outlive his own immediate impact.

Is this, what is driving this push by Kissinger?  I know that other famous gray beards of foreign policy: Sam Nunn, George Schultz, and William Perry have signed on as supporters of renewed efforts at nuclear arms reductions.  But it is Kissinger who is most interesting.  For a man so often vilified as an unscrupulous "realpolitiker" who was more Machiavelli than Kant, it appears he is trying his hand at embracing a high morality that can be viewed favorable by those not inculcated by the dour spirit of European "realism."

In his Harvard thesis Kissinger has been quoted saying: "Transitoriness is the fate of existence. No civilization has yet been permanent, no longing completely fulfilled. This is necessity, the fatedness of history, the dilemma of mortality.”

It appears Kissinger is tempting fate by attempting to resolve one of the thorniest of moral dilemas.  He is much too intelligent to believe this to be an easy task, or even one that can be completed.  He states this in the Newsweek piece, "My colleague Sam Nunn has described the effort as akin to climbing a mountain shrouded in clouds. We cannot describe its top nor be certain that there may not be unforeseen and perhaps insurmountable obstacles on the way. But we are prepared to undertake the journey in the belief that the summit will never come into view unless we begin the ascent and deal with the proliferation issues immediately before us, including the Iranian and North Korean nuclear programs."

I have long argued we are entering the "Golden Age of Proliferation."  Kissinger is making a last gasp effort to block this as he says it is not inevitable.  However, his own admonition, "Our age has stolen fire from the gods; can we confine it to peaceful purposes before it consumes us?" I believe betrays what he thinks will ultimately happen. 

Prometheus stole fire and suffered immensely for his hubris.  From the day we successfully developed nuclear weapons, we too stole fire.  Thus far, except for Hiroshima and Nagasaki, mankind has avoided a similar fate despite our trangression.   Can such fate be tempted indefinitely? 

History will be the judge.  I hope we choose wisely, not rashly and not naively. 

Given the season, I decided to be reflective on Christian thinking and decided to read a famous work by Reinhold Niebuhr, the Irony of American History.  Given how many American politicians claim to be inspired by Niebuhr, from President- elect Obama to his opponent Sen. McCain, it seemed wise to see what he says.

While this book is by no means an exhaustive look at his overall corpus, it was illuminating.  Written during the tumultous early years of the Cold War when nuclear annihilation was a possible outcome of the conflict, Niebuhr eloquently points to the serious flaws and dangers of Marxist-Leninism.  Yet, while defending America from much criticism (and generally supporting America in its conflict with Marxist-Leninism), he finds flaws in America.  He finds "irony" abounding throughout history.  He notes that man can transcend nature, but by being a creator as well as a creature of history, he finds it difficult to find ultimate meaning.

This can facilitate situations where even those who believe themselves to be doing the morally correct thing can actually become imperious and distrusted by their friends due to their blindness and unwillingness to examine their own limitations.  Niebuhr is clear that human life should not be seen as "tragic" where the great hero is evemtually toppled due to a conscience decision born of hubris, nor is he "pathetic" or trapped completely within a prison of circumstance wholly beyond his control.  Rather, man is "ironic" in that he is capable of transcendence, yet he often has his wings clipped as result of decisions made not so much through willful calculation, but almost by organic movement growth.

Unsurprsingly, he calls for humility and makes clear this is the cornerstone of Christian faith (though he wisely refuses to make the humility of the poor the be all and end all of morality, recognizing that the resentments of the poor are often as self-interested as the conceit of the rich).

Several snippets below I fond particularly insightful as we continue to struggle with determining how best to wield the power that we have. 

"Ironic contrasts and incongruitites have an element of the comic in them in so far as they exhibit absurd juxtapositions of strength and weakeness; of wisdom through foolishness; or foolishness as the fruit of wisdon; of guilt arising from the pretensions of innocency; or innocency hiding behind ostensible guilt.  Yet contrasts are ironic only if htey are not merely absurd, but have a hidden meaning.  They must elicit not merely laughter but a knowing smile.  The hidden meaning is supplied by the fact that the juxtapositions and contrasts are not merely fortuitous.  They are related to each other by some foible of the person who is involved in both.  The powerful person who is proved to be really weak is involved in an ironic contrast only if his weakness is due to some pretension of strength.  If 'pride cometh before the fall,' the fall is ironic only if pride contributed to it...

The Biblical interpretation of the human situation is ironic, rather than tragic or pathetic, because of its unique formulation of the problem of human freedom.  According to this faith man's freedom does not require his heroic and tragic defiance of the forces of nature.  He is not necessarily involved in tragedy in his effort to be truly human.  But neither is he necessarily involved in evil because of his relation to the necessities and contingincies of the world of nature.  His situation is, therefore, not comprehended as a pathetic imprisonment in  the confusion of nature.  The evil in human history is regarded as the consequence of man's wrong use of his unique capacities.  The wrong use is always due to some failure to recognize the limits of his capacities of power, wisdom and virtue.  Man is an ironic creature because he forgets that he is not simply a creator but also a creature."

I come away believing that one cannot ignore the power they have and turn inward, hoping to be merely "left alone" and allowed to return to the tranquility of times past.  This means, we must be engaged. 

I also recognize that we, in America, often do not appreciate how we are perceived by others.  This lack of appreciation yields anger and resentment when we are called to account by other nations and people for actions we take to be virtuous and necessary. 

We cannot escape our position and we cannot escape our condemnation for being in such a position.   The truth is we are not as noble as we wish to believe, though we are simultaneously far more noble than we are typically accused by others of being.  I suspect an ironic smile and acknowledgement of this would help us to not ignore the opinion of our fellow man, yet also not flagellate ourselves ceaselessly as some are so desirous of doing.

While America worries about its current economic malaise, a troubling trend is emerging in the Middle East that has great potential to eventually yield devastating results.  Namely, this is the increasing likelihood of the entire region arming itself to the teeth with nuclear weapons.  This article from the Wall Street Journal should be sobering. 

The real threat of Iran going nuclear is more than typically asserted.  There is no doubt the Arab nations will seek to counter the "Persian" bomb.  Once this happens, despite America's apparent efforts at incorporating Arab states into a new missile defense structure (see the recent deals betwen the US and the United Arab Emirates), there will be no good way to rationalize away their desire to obtain weapons comparable to what Iran will have.

Clearly, this has the potential to be greatly destabilizing to the region and global oil supplies.  I know that some strategists may believe that all the Middle East pointing nuclear warheads at each other may lend itself to stability akin to what was acquired during the US-Soviet faceoff of the Cold War, but I don't think we count on the same level of relative rationality to prevail under this scenario.  This makes this entire region, complete with the instability of the nuclear armed Pakistan, a true nightmare regarding nuclear non-proliferation and the threat of nuclear terrorism.  I have argued many times on this blog that we are entering the "Golden Age of Proliferation."  Nothing happening at this moment dissuades me from believing this is happening and even more rapidly than I would have initially envisioned.

Once more I turn to Stratfor for an excellent macroscopic view of what is going on in the world.  What is in teresting in this analysis is the role ascribed to the nation-state which has, as Stratfor makes clear, been much derided recently in our rush to embrace globalization and international institutions.

Perhaps, Westphalia does live in ways good and bad.  International anarchy will remain with us for a long time to come. 

"In 1989, the global system pivoted when the Soviet Union retreated from Eastern Europe and began the process of disintegration that culminated in its collapse. In 2001, the system pivoted again when al Qaeda attacked targets in the United States on Sept. 11, triggering a conflict that defined the international system until the summer of 2008. The pivot of 2008 turned on two dates, Aug. 7 and Oct. 11.

On Aug. 7, Georgian troops attacked the country’s breakaway region of South Ossetia. On Aug. 8, Russian troops responded by invading Georgia. The Western response was primarily rhetorical. On the weekend of Oct. 11, the G-7 met in Washington to plan a joint response to the global financial crisis. Rather than defining a joint plan, the decision — by default — was that each nation would act to save its own financial system with a series of broadly agreed upon guidelines.

The Aug. 7 and Oct. 11 events are connected only in their consequences. Each showed the weakness of international institutions and confirmed the primacy of the nation-state, or more precisely, the nation and the state. (A nation is a collection of people who share an ethnicity. A state is the entity that rules a piece of land. A nation-state — the foundation of the modern international order — is what is formed when the nation and state overlap.) Together, the two events posed challenges that overwhelmed the global significance of the Iraqi and Afghan wars.

The Conflict in Georgia

In and of itself, Russia’s attack on Georgia was not globally significant. Georgia is a small country in the Caucasus, and its fate ultimately does not affect the world. But Georgia was aligned with the United States and with Europe, and it had been seen by some as a candidate for membership in NATO. Thus, what was important about the Russian attack was that it occurred at all, and that the West did not respond to it beyond rhetoric.

Part of the problem was that the countries that could have intervened on Georgia’s behalf lacked the ability to do so. The Americans were bogged down in the Islamic world, and the Europeans had let their military forces atrophy. But even if military force had been available, it is clear that NATO, as the military expression of the Western alliance, was incapable of any unified action. There was no unified understanding of NATO’s obligation and, more importantly, no collective understanding of what a unified strategy might be.

The tension was not only between the United States and Europe, but also among the European countries. This was particularly pronounced in the different view of the situation Germany took compared to that of the United States and many other countries. Very soon after the Russo-Georgian war had ended, the Germans made clear that they opposed the expansion of NATO to Georgia and Ukraine. A major reason for this is Germany’s heavy dependence on Russian natural gas, which means Berlin cannot afford to alienate Moscow. But there was a deeper reason: Germany had been in the front line of the first Cold War and had no desire to participate in a second.

The range of European responses to Russia was fascinating. The British were livid. The French were livid but wanted to mediate. The Germans were cautious, and Chancellor Angela Merkel traveled to St. Petersburg to hold a joint press conference with Russian President Dmitri Medvedev, aligning Germany with Russia — for all practical purposes — on the Georgian and Ukrainian issues.

The single most important effect of Russia’s attack on Georgia was that it showed clearly how deeply divided — and for that matter, how weak — NATO is in general and the Europeans are in particular. Had they been united, they would not have been able to do much. But they avoided that challenge by being utterly fragmented. NATO can only work when there is a consensus, and the war revealed how far from consensus NATO was. It can’t be said that NATO collapsed after Georgia. It is still there, and NATO officials hold meetings and press conferences. But the alliance is devoid of both common purpose and resources, except in very specific and limited areas. Some Europeans are working through NATO in Afghanistan, for example, but not most, and not in a decisive fashion.

The Russo-Georgian war raised profound questions about the future of the multinational military alliance. Each member consulted its own national interest and conducted its own foreign policy. At this point, splits between the Europeans and Americans are taken for granted, but the splits among the Europeans are profound. If it was no longer possible to say that NATO functioned, it was also unclear after Aug. 8 in what sense the Europeans existed, except as individual nation-states.

The Global Financial Crisis

What was demonstrated in politico-military terms in Georgia was then demonstrated in economic terms in the financial crisis. All of the multinational systems created after World War II failed during the crisis — or more precisely, the crisis went well beyond their briefs and resources. None of the systems could cope, and many broke down. On Oct. 11, it became clear that the G-7 could cooperate, but not through unified action. On Oct. 12, when the Europeans held their eurozone summit, it became clear that they would only act as individual nations.

As with the aftermath of the Georgian war, the most significant developments after Oct. 11 happened in Europe. The European Union is first and foremost an arrangement for managing Europe’s economy. Its bureaucracy in Brussels has increased its authority and effectiveness throughout the last decade. The problem with the European Union is that it was an institution designed to manage prosperity. When it confronted serious adversity, however, it froze, devolving power to the component states.

Consider the European Central Bank (EC, an institution created for managing the euro. Its primary charge — and only real authority — is to work to limit inflation. But limiting inflation is a problem that needs to be addressed when economies are otherwise functioning well. The financial crisis is a case where the European system is malfunctioning. The ECB was not created to deal with that. It has managed, with the agreement of member governments, to expand its function beyond inflation control, but it ultimately lacks the staff or the mindset to do all the things that other central banks were doing. To be more precise, it is a central bank without a single finance ministry to work with. Unlike other central banks, whose authority coincides with the nations they serve, the ECB serves multiple nations with multiple interests and finance ministries. By its nature, its power is limited.

In the end, power did not reside with Europe, but rather with its individual countries. It wasn’t Brussels that was implementing decisions made in Strasbourg; the centers of power were in Paris, London, Rome, Berlin and the other capitals of Europe and the world. Power devolved back to the states that governed nations. Or, to be more precise, the twin crises revealed that power had never left there.

Between the events in Georgia and the financial crisis, what we saw was the breakdown of multinational entities. This was particularly marked in Europe, in large part because the Europeans were the most invested in multilateralism and because they were in the crosshairs of both crises. The Russian resurgence affected them the most, and the fallout of the U.S. financial crisis hit them the hardest. They had to improvise the most, being multilateral but imperfectly developed, to say the least. In a sense, the Europeans were the laboratory of multilateralism and its intersection with crisis.

But it was not a European problem in the end. What we saw was a global phenomenon in which individual nations struggled to cope with the effects of the financial crisis and of Russia. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, there has been a tendency to view the world in terms of global institutions, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization. In the summer of 2008, none of these functioned. The only things that did function effectively were national institutions.

Since 2001, the assumption has been that subnational groups like al Qaeda would define the politico-military environment. In U.S. Defense Department jargon, the assumption was that peer-to-peer conflict was no longer an issue and that it was all about small terrorist groups. The summer of 2008 demonstrated that while terrorism by subnational groups is not insignificant by any means, the dynamics of nation-states have hardly become archaic.

The Importance of the State

Clearly, the world has pivoted toward the nation-state as the prime actor and away from transnational and subnational groups. The financial crisis could be solved by monetizing the net assets of societies to correct financial imbalances. The only institution that could do that was the state, which could use its sovereign power and credibility, based on its ability to tax the economy, to underwrite the financial system.

Around the world, states did just that. They did it in very national ways. Many European states did it primarily by guaranteeing interbank loans, thereby essentially nationalizing the heart of the financial system. If states guarantee loans, the risk declines to near zero. In that case, the rationing of money through market mechanisms collapses. The state must take over rationing. This massively increases the power of the state — and raises questions about how the Europeans back out of this position.

The Americans took a different approach, less focused on interbank guarantees than on reshaping the balance sheets of financial institutions by investing in them. It was a more indirect approach and less efficient in the short run, but the Americans were more interested than the Europeans in trying to create mechanisms that would allow the state to back out of control of the financial system.

But what is most important is to see the manner in which state power surged in the summer and fall of 2008. The balance of power between business and the state, always dynamic, underwent a profound change, with the power of the state surging and the power of business contracting. Power was not in the hands of Lehman Brothers or Barclays. It was in the hands of Washington and London. At the same time, the power of the nation surged as the importance of multilateral organizations and subnational groups declined. The nation-state roared back to life after it had seemed to be drifting into irrelevance.

The year 1989 did not quite end the Cold War, but it created a world that bypassed it. The year 2001 did not end the post-Cold War world, but it overlaid it with an additional and overwhelming dynamic: that of the U.S.-jihadist war. The year 2008 did not end the U.S.-jihadist war, but it overlaid it with far more immediate and urgent issues. The financial crisis, of course, was one. The future of Russian power was another. We should point out that the importance of Russian power is this: As soon as Russia dominates the center of the Eurasian land mass, its force intrudes on Europe. Russia united with the rest of Europe is an overwhelming global force. Europe resisting Russia defines the global system. Russia fragmented opens the door for other geopolitical issues. Russia united and powerful usurps the global stage.

The year 2008 has therefore seen two things. First, and probably most important, it resurrected the nation-state and shifted the global balance between the state and business. Second, it redefined the global geopolitical system, opening the door to a resurgence of Russian power and revealing the underlying fragmentation of Europe and weaknesses of NATO.

The most important manifestation of this is Europe. In the face of Russian power, there is no united European position. In the face of the financial crisis, the Europeans coordinate, but they do not act as one. After the summer of 2008, it is no longer fair to talk about Europe as a single entity, about NATO as a fully functioning alliance, or about a world in which the nation-state is obsolete. The nation-state was the only institution that worked.

This is far more important than either of the immediate issues. The fate of Georgia is of minor consequence to the world. The financial crisis will pass into history, joining Brady bonds, the Resolution Trust Corp. and the bailout of New York City as a historical oddity. What will remain is a new international system in which the Russian question — followed by the German question — is once again at the center of things, and in which states act with confidence in shaping the economic and business environment for better or worse.

The world is a very different place from what it was in the spring of 2008. Or, to be more precise, it is a much more traditional place than many thought. It is a world of nations pursuing their own interests and collaborating where they choose. Those interests are economic, political and military, and they are part of a single fabric. The illusion of multilateralism was not put to rest — it will never die — but it was certainly put to bed. It is a world we can readily recognize from history."

A great philosophical examination of this summer's runaway hit, the Dark Knight.  Very interesting and worth looking at in depth.

I think we need a Batman to face down the threats of instability.  However, in now way is a "Batman" a "good" thing, it is merely that which is necessary.   Chaos can lead to nothingness, let us not be nihilists...

"Here, the Joker's violence is aimed at proving a very clear point: that deep down, we're all the same as him — "only as good as the world allows (us) to be". "I've demonstrated there's no difference between me and everyone else!" boasts the Joker in Alan Moore's classic comic The Killing Joke, on which Nolan's rendering of the villain is based. Hence the Joker's claim that those who proclaim rules and institute order, such as politicians or police officers, are simply hypocrites who pretend to uphold moral codes, which are promptly "dropped at the first sign of trouble". Far better to be consistent: "The only sensible way to live in this world is without rules." It is in this sense that the Joker is "an agent of chaos". Not mindless chaos, but the idea that those who would control society are contemptible.  They're schemers trying to control their worlds … I show the schemers how pathetic their attempts to control things really are."

He explicitly does not want to kill Batman ("What would I do without you?"), but he certainly wants Batman to kill him. This would violate Batman's "one rule" and prove the Joker's point. That is why Harvey Dent, the promised "White Knight" is so central. The Joker kills Dent's fiancee, not because he wants her dead, but because he wants to drive Dent to darkness. If he can transform the incorruptible district attorney into a murderer, the argument is won. Recall the Joker's delight as he hands Dent a loaded gun and presses it against his own head, enticing Dent to shoot him. When Dent leaves this decision to the toss of a coin, then exclaims: "Now you're talking!" he knows Dent has fallen.

Is that a political cause? In a very broad sense it is, though not in the sense we often use the phrase. He does not seek any clearly identifiable, concrete political outcomes. His politics are far more abstract, philosophical, even artistic. He argues not for a world ruled by him, but for one without rules altogether. Ideologically, he is not so much an anarchist as a nihilist. He is a terrorist, then, but one who advocates a belief in nothing."

From a news snippet from the Nuclear Threat Initiative regarding a new Council on Foreign Relations report about new nuclear deterrence.

Timely given what I believe to be the new "Golden Age of Proliferation."  However, it seems a little too "safe."  Its not bold.  Check out the bolded sections for the highlights:


"The United States must develop a nuclear deterrence strategy that moves away from Cold War ways of thinking, the Council on Foreign Relations said in a report issued yesterday (see GSN, Aug. 5).

While the nuclear-armed powers in decades past sought to deter an atomic exchange through the threat of a devastating response, that is almost certain to fail against a terrorist group armed with a nuclear bomb, experts argue.

Nonetheless, there is a widespread argument for a system of deterrence that would emphasize threats against nations to ensure they do not provide terrorists with nuclear weapons or sensitive materials, according to the nonpartisan organization.

“The rush to transform Cold War deterrence into a weapon against nuclear terrorism opens the door to a host of unintended yet dangerous consequences,” states the report, Deterring State Sponsorship of Nuclear Terrorism.  “Wielded wisely, a new twist on deterrence can make important contributions to strengthening nuclear security.  But applied incautiously and indiscriminately, it could deeply undermine efforts to that same end.”

Report author Michael Levi rejected arguments that threatening other governments could lead them to increase security against diversion of nuclear material into terrorists’ hands.  Such threats could instead reduce cooperation in the nuclear security sector and would generally not provide a significant amount of leverage, he said in a press release.  One exception could be in the case of LACE w:st="on">North KoreaLACE>, Levi said.

Among the report’s recommendations are:

— Focusing on cooperation with Pakistan and Russia  “Threatening retaliation against countries like Russia and Pakistan in response to terrorist attacks stemming from lax security practices is unwise,” the report says.  “It undercuts efforts to work cooperatively with those states to improve their nuclear security; dissuades those states from informing others if they discover that their nuclear weapons or materials are ever stolen, thus undermining any efforts to recover them; and makes it difficult to work with those states in the aftermath of an attack to prevent further detonations.  At the same time, U.S. threats are likely to do little to actually encourage (Russia orPakistan) to take nuclear terrorism more seriously”;

— Using caution in any deterrence plan for North Korea.  North Korea is unique among nuclear states in that there is a real prospect that, absent the possibility of retaliation, its leaders might deliberately transfer nuclear materials to a terrorist group. ... Strategists are thus correct to adapt Cold War deterrence to this case.  But this task is not as simple as having the ability to attribute nuclear materials to North Korea and threatening to retaliate following any attack”;

— Using restraint in ambiguous situations.  "The United States must sharpen its declaratory policy by stating that the U.S. president may still decide, based on compelling but imperfect evidence, to retaliate following a nuclear terrorist attack.  At the same time, if the United States does retaliate following a terrorist attack, it must be firm (almost certainly by applying substantial force against military targets), but, most likely, restrained, including by avoiding the use of nuclear weapons and by stopping short of regime change”; and

— Displaying U.S. capabilities to determine the source of nuclear material.  The United States “should aim to increase its perceived ability to attribute such attacks not only by investing more in the means to trace nuclear materials, but also by publicly demonstrating those capabilities on a regular basis by consistently and vigorously investigating nuclear leaks and publicizing the results,” the report says.  “It should also develop shared procedures and understandings with North Korea's neighbors ... for deciding whether Pyongyang is the source of nuclear materials used in any attack” (Council on Foreign Relations release, Sept. 22).

Quite clearly, the US should display its ability to "source" possible nuclear material.  However, what happens in those ambiguous cases where iron clad proof remains elusive?  Are we then to be unable to retaliate?  Clearly, this issue of proliferation is much larger than only the gangster type regime in Pyongyang.  How do we confront Tehran, not to mention any number of other nations soon to travel down the path of seeking their own nuclear capacity? 

In order to calibrate deterrence, it would seem we must be able to definitively attribute the source of any material used in a possible terrorist attack.  However, I am deeply concerned we won't be able to do this quickly enough to ensure a viable deterrent or, for that matter, accurately enough either.

Finally, one element of the report indicates we should not threaten retaliation due to "lax security" lest we run the risk of those nations not cooperating in the first place.  Obviously, that is a legitimate concern, but are we so sure there would be cooperation anyway, irrespective of our official policy with respect to retaliation?  No doubt baseless accusations and threats is folly in the extreme, but disregarding all possible options as a matter of course without at least reviewing the contingency of the moment seems quite the folly as well.

I am opening my second blog, this one of TownHall.com  Please feel free to visit my main blog over at www.gregrlawson.com for the most updates.  I will occassionally put one of my favorite postings over here as well.